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Abstract Franchisors capitalize on franchisee entrepre-
neurial capacity to grow. However, enabling franchisees
to develop their ventures may damage system consis-
tency. This dilemma makes conflict particularly preva-
lent in the field of franchising. Nevertheless, prior re-
search has reported an incomplete picture of factors
leading to serious disagreement and premature termina-
tion in franchise partnerships. We address this gap, first,
by adding the entrepreneurial autonomy of franchisees
as a relevant but underexplored source of conflict and,
second, by providing a more fine-grained analysis of
franchisors’ versus franchisees’ drivers of termination.
Specifically, we focus on the controversial issues of
pricing and local advertising policies and analyze how
expanding franchisees’ entrepreneurial autonomy in
these decision areas is related to contract terminations
depending onwho ended the relationship (the franchisor
or a franchisee). The study also highlights less contro-
versial requirements and conditions (e.g., upfront in-
vestments, franchisor experience …) that may reduce
early terminations. Our empirical objectives are met by
using survey data from a sample of franchisor compa-
nies. The results show how the performance outcomes
of entrepreneurial autonomy differ depending on the
decision area in which it is exercised. Results also throw
light on the consequences of various critical franchise
policies that may be masked if both types of termination
(franchisors vs. franchisees) are considered together.
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1 Introduction
Relationships with external partners are considered an
important tool for improving SME knowledge and capa-
bilities (Szarka 1990; Street and Cameron 2007;
Bocconcelli et al. 2016). However, although external
partners may help SMEs to enhance their competitive
advantage and entrepreneurial success (Stuart et al. 1999;
Stuart 2000; Elfring and Hulsink 2003; Arend 2006; Bi
et al. 2017), they may also result in conflict, with firms
losing control over their businesses and failing to meet
their expectations. As a consequence, the entrepreneur-
ship and small business literature has recognized the need
to investigate the risks associated with engaging in exter-
nal relationships and the conditions under which relation-
ships may fail (Street and Cameron 2007).
Prior studies, however, have so far reported an in-
complete picture of factors leading to serious conflict
and unplanned termination in inter-firm alliances
(Bakker 2016, Dan and Zondag 2016). This paper de-
velops this research line by examining the factors that
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lead to premature terminations in the particular setting of
franchise agreements.
The study is based on the idea that franchising rep-
resents an entrepreneurial team between two dissimilar
entrepreneurs, franchisor, and franchisees (Kaufmann
and Dant 1999; Clarkin and Rosa 2005; Combs et al.
2011). Together, they expand a business concept in
extensive markets, but they differ in their roles and
particular interests. On the one hand, franchisees benefit
from a differentiated business and the time-tested know-
how of the franchisor (Michael 1999b). Specifically,
franchising facilitates jump-start entrepreneurial activi-
ties by providing SMEs with competitive awareness and
appropriate knowledge (Paswan and Rajamma 2016)
and may even facilitate economic development in their
regions (Michael 2014). On the other hand, franchisors
benefit from the franchisees’ management capabilities
and specific local know-how in the running of their
outlets (Kaufmann and Eroglu 1999; Sorenson and
Sørensen 2001) that helps them to overcome entrepre-
neurial capacity shortages (Norton 1988).
The role of franchisors, as owners and creators of the
business concept, is to lay down the terms and condi-
tions that apply to franchisees’ responsibility, in order to
protect system-wide standards (e.g., brand name stabil-
ity). However, this may be tricky because the two part-
ners may disagree on certain provisions which, although
pursuing homogeneity and preventing deviations, may
also lead to serious conflict and eventual contract termi-
nations. Actually, the very complexity of the franchise
relationship makes conflict especially prevalent in this
setting (Spinelli and Birley 1998; Winsor et al. 2012).
For our purpose, franchise conflict is conceptualized
as problematic differences arising between franchisor
and franchisees in response to obstacles that pose a
threat to the achievement of their respective goals
(Weaven et al. 2010). But only serious conflict and
disputes end up in early terminations as a last resort
solution (Winsor et al. 2012). Prior research has reported
significant franchise termination rates, to the extent that
lawmakers have considered information on terminations
necessary for making a sound decision on the purchase
of a particular franchise license (Clarkin 2008).1
Nevertheless, the key factors that lead to serious
conflict and relationship terminations in franchising re-
main underexplored. Previous work is based on case
studies and/or interviews with rich qualitative informa-
tion (Frazer and Winzar 2005; Weaven et al. 2010;
Winsor et al. 2012) and highlights the importance of
franchisor-franchisee fit. This involves, for franchisors,
recruiting suitable franchisees and, for franchisees, join-
ing a franchise chain congruent with personal goals and
abilities. Extant research has also explored various con-
textual factors affecting terminations, such as industry,
system size, or growth (Holmberg and Morgan 2003),
and also relates terminations to franchisor support and
life cycle (Frazer 2001).
Although the above insights are useful, they have
generally overlooked two important issues: (i) the influ-
ence of the entrepreneurial autonomy of franchisee
firms as a significant driver of terminations and (ii) the
potential differences between franchisor and franchi-
sees in their reactions to conflict prevention strategies.
To address these gaps, drawing on agency and
resource-based theories, the paper examines the after-
math of two different sets of policies in terms of their
capacity to explain franchise terminations. One set
builds on the findings of Michael and Combs (2008)
and is composed of policies aiming to prevent agency
problems (and reduce failure), such as training pro-
grams, or experience requirements. Our prediction is
that these will have the same impact on franchisors
and franchisees in terms of serious conflict and early
terminations generated within the system. The other set
deals with the degree of entrepreneurial autonomy of
franchisees; namely, the extent to which the franchisees
are able to freely decide how to operate their outlets
outside the standardized confines of the franchise sys-
tem (Dada 2016). Autonomy provides franchisees with
the freedom and flexibility they need for entrepreneurial
activities (i.e., risk-taking, innovative, and proactive
initiatives) (Lumpkin et al. 2009). However, although
the franchisor’s autonomy is usually undisputed, that of
franchisees is debatable (Grünhagen et al. 2014; Dada
2016). We specifically examine franchisees’ autonomy
in two decision areas, pricing and local advertising. We
consider the delegation of these policies as controversial
issues and analyze how decentralizing themmay impact
contract terminations differently, depending on whether
these are initiated by the franchisor or a franchisee.
Building on these arguments, and using franchisors’
survey data, the study contributes to the literature in
1 For instance, US regulation compels franchisors to reveal the number
of early terminations in their systems during recent years in the Uni-
form Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) (Clarkin 2008). Similarly,
Spanish law obliges franchisors to include this information in the
precontractual documents sent to prospects.
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several ways. First, we address the still limited research
regarding how entrepreneurial autonomymay drive per-
formance in entrepreneurial teams (i.e., franchise net-
works). Even though autonomy has been considered
basic for stimulating entrepreneurial orientation and val-
ue creation (Lumpkin et al. 2009; Wales et al. 2013),
only a few studies have examined the relationship be-
tween entrepreneurial autonomy and business perfor-
mance (a recent contribution is Karimi and Walter
2016). Moreover, they have rarely tackled the negative
impacts of autonomy on performance. In addition, most
studies of entrepreneurial autonomy are limited to a
firm-level analysis and neglect this entrepreneurial di-
mension beyond the company boundaries. We extend
the research to the supra-level of inter-firm networks,
and analyze how different autonomy profiles within
entrepreneurial teams may explain failure.
Second, with the exception of a few exploratory
studies (e.g., Frazer and Winzar 2005; Weaven et al.
2010), most research on franchise conflict analyzes the
sources and effects of conflict on only one side of the
dyad: either the franchisees or the franchisor (e.g., Da-
vies et al. 2011; Winsor et al. 2012; Weaven et al. 2014;
Kang and Jindal 2015; López-Bayón and López-
Fernández 2016). However, the franchise network is a
community of mutually dependent entrepreneurs, in
which franchisees are distinct entities with autonomy
and innovative aspirations (Davies et al. 2011). Conse-
quently, it is important to analyze both franchisors’ and
franchisees’ concerns (Dant 2008) to avoid providing
only a partial account of the underlying basis of fran-
chise conflict. This study addresses this gap,
disentangling the different impacts that the allocation
of various decisions rights (i.e., pricing and local adver-
tising) may have on franchisors vs. franchisee termina-
tions. Thus, the study demonstrates that the extent to
which entrepreneurial autonomy may influence early
terminations depends not only on the decision area in
which it is exercised (López-Bayón and López-
Fernández 2016)—in our case, pricing vs. local adver-
tising decisions—but also on who terminates the rela-
tionship (i.e., the franchisees or the franchisor). More-
over, we provide new evidence on how franchisees and
franchisors react differently to various policies consid-
ered in the literature as conflict preventers (e.g., training
policies and previous experience requirements).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section presents the conceptual framework and
research hypotheses. The following sections describe
the research design and the empirical results. The final
section offers implications for researchers and
practitioners.
2 Theory and hypotheses
Franchisors draft their contracts with the aim of achiev-
ing consistency within the firm and minimizing agency
problems. However, franchising agreements are neces-
sarily incomplete because they govern long-term, ongo-
ing relationships that cannot be perfectly foreseen (Had-
field 1990; Hendrikse et al. 2015; Solís-Rodríguez and
González-Díaz 2016). As Hadfield puts it, contracts are
Bbroad in scope, but short on detail^ (1990, p. 991).
Even so, very often franchisees neither read the contract
nor follow it closely in daily operations (Bradach 1998;
Clarkin and Rosa 2005).
In principle, franchisors have developed the brand
and are in charge of updating it. But franchisees also
introduce revisions of the original model when
implementing it. Franchisees, as entrepreneurs, seek
the best return on their investments and are highly
committed to success. Sometimes, when seeking new
opportunities, they introduce novelties. For these rea-
sons, franchisors provide entrepreneurial autonomy in
certain fields where there may be potential advantages
from adapting to the environment. These are the periph-
eral aspects of the business (Kaufmann and Eroglu
1999) that do not compromise the homogeneity of the
brand, but may ultimately enhance franchisees’ local
adaptive capacity (Winter et al. 2012) and their motiva-
tion bymeeting their entrepreneur’s desire for autonomy
(Dant and Gundlach 1999). Moreover, as franchisees
contribute to growth, franchisors tend to recruit pros-
pects that are likely to behave more like entrepreneurs
than investors (Zachary et al. 2011).
However, there is a trade-off between tailoring prod-
ucts and services to particular environments and the
threat of contractual hazards. These hazards come from
mistakes, opportunism, and costly monitoring.
Franchisees may modify the business concept detri-
mentally if they overestimate the degree of idiosyncrasy
of their demand or if they underestimate the complexity
that underlies the building of goodwill (Winter et al.
2012). Additionally, some franchisees may behave op-
portunistically, trying to save costs at the expense of
service quality. Such behavior may be individually re-
warding if spillover effects are in place and customers
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do not always patronize the same outlet. Finally, dele-
gation of decision rights raises the costs of monitoring
and enforcing quality standards because it will be more
difficult to prove contract violations when outlets be-
come more diverse and benchmarking less appropriate.
In summary, incompleteness and delegation of
decision rights favor innovation and adaptation but
at the risk of damaging image consistency
(Kaufmann and Eroglu 1999) and performance
(Szulanski and Jensen 2008) and increasing moni-
toring costs. So, delegation creates a trade-off be-
tween Bloss of control^ for the franchisor and a
positive Bincentive effect^ for franchisees, and this
has opposing effects on residual income. The con-
tention of this paper is that this equilibrium will
determine the level of manifest conflict within the
franchise system and the different propensities of
franchisors and franchisees to terminate their
relationship.
The study first considers several policies and
requirements that are expected to prevent agency
problems by providing some common knowledge
and shared expectations among the partners, thus
improving their fit. Specifically, we focus on proce-
dures to curtail franchisee failure in the chain or to
diminish management myopia which would lessen
conflict and early terminations by both franchisor
and franchisees.
Second, the paper examines franchisees’ entrepre-
neurial autonomy in two decision areas: local adver-
tising and pricing. Starting from the above trade-off
model, we argue that franchisors and franchisees
may have different perceptions regarding the appro-
priate level of empowerment in these decision areas.
Consequently, a particular allocation of a specific
decision right may have opposite effects on either
side of the partnership regarding conflicts and their
propensity to terminate the franchise relationship.
Specifically, when decentralization is followed by a
reduction in the franchisor’s residual income (be-
cause of his loss of control) that exceeds the fran-
chisees’ positive incentive effects, franchisor termi-
nations will increase while franchisee terminations
will remain stable or even decrease.
2.1 Policies aiming to reduce early terminations
This section presents a set of policies that include
franchisors’ requirements to select franchisees with
some prior experience, policies regarding investment
obligations in physical and human capital, and the
filter of franchisor experience. All of them may help
to establish common, shared knowledge of business
facts and practices. As long as they may reduce
mistakes and misbehavior, we expect them to tend
to reduce all kinds of termination, no matter who
initiates them.
2.1.1 Franchisees’ prior industry experience
requirements
Franchisees terminate contracts because they do not
meet their expectations. We assume that a key factor
leading to this decision is outlet underperformance,
although the full background picture includes other
concerns such as personal circumstances and prefer-
ences. Apart from external reasons relating to competi-
tion in the marketplace, franchisee failure may also stem
from wrong selection of franchisees and the resources
and capabilities provided by both franchisor and
franchisee.
Misconceptions impact upon future goal align-
ment and conflict. They come largely from inability
to conduct adequate due diligence, or preinvestment
screening, regarding the business concept before
franchisees join the franchise chain (Weaven et al.
2010). They may also come from a propensity
among franchisees to overestimate their own ability
(Michael and Combs 2008) or from poor selection
on the franchisor side (Frazer and Winzar 2005).
The problem is so relevant that one of the salient
recommendations of Australian authorities to avoid and
solve disputes was better franchisee education (Weaven
et al. 2010) to be aware of possible shortcomings in the
relationship.
In order to lessen the probability of these issues,
some franchisors select franchisees on the basis of
their business or sales ability or their knowledge of
the local market and provide them with any neces-
sary technical background (Frazer and Winzar 2005;
Brookes and Altinay 2011). Many other franchisors
require prior industry experience as a guarantee that
prospects have baseline levels of expertise in the
field (Michael and Combs 2008). In keeping with
an appropriate recruitment, empirical evidence (out-
side franchising) shows that prior management ex-
perience may also be a strong factor in entrepreneur-
ial success. Hence, franchisors interested in
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franchisee entrepreneurial traits may demand this
experience to applicants (Gillis et al. 2011). Further-
more, the requirement of prior experience may deter
low-quality franchisees from misrepresenting their
abilities when searching for rents (Shane 1998).2
Weaven et al. (2010) found that the franchisees
who did not appraise the franchise business concept
accurately or had not objectively estimated their
own capacity were more likely to take for granted
unrealistic expectations of their performance. On the
other hand, franchisees’ prior business experience
usually involves having some basic managerial
skills as well as previous knowledge of the target
market in which they operate (Norton 1988). Such
knowledge and competences may help them to make
sound judgments. Our hypothesis is therefore the
following:
& H1: Requirements of prior industry experience re-
duce early terminations by franchisors and
franchisees.
2.1.2 Investment obligations: upfront investments
and training programs
Franchise partners’ decisions to terminate the contract
are also affected by the appraisal of switching costs
associated with a termination compared to the potential
gains derived from continuing in the relationship. When
the benefits (both economic and affective) of an endur-
ing relationship are greater, this fact may generate com-
mitment of the partners, thus reducing early termina-
tions (Meek et al. 2011; Kang and Jindal 2015;
Mignonac et al. 2015).
We consider two sources of commitment that may
play a role in reducing terminations initiated by
franchisees and by franchisors: initial investment
requirements and franchise training programs.3 First,
commitment starts growing at the beginning of the
relationship, when franchisees make various initial
investments to enter the franchise chain that cannot
be salvaged if they abandon the relationship. A few
examples of such sunk costs are system identifiers,
signage, store alterations, and business licenses. The
value of these investments is considerably lower or
even nil outside the franchising relationship and, as
long as they are specific assets, they may enhance
franchisees’ economic commitment and thus lower
the i r propens i ty to leave the re la t ionship
(Williamson 1985; Blair and Lafontaine 2005). Ad-
ditionally, as initial investments increase, so do dif-
ficulties for finding new associates and set-up costs
regarding franchisee replacement (Combs and
Castrogiovanni 1994). From this point of view, fran-
chisors’ propensity to terminate the relationship will
also decrease as the level of initial investments rises.
Second, franchisors may foster franchisees’ skills
with training that stimulates their knowledge, abilities,
and commitment to the business. In fact, franchisors
periodically train franchisees to complement their hu-
man capital, and to update business practices and rou-
tines and maintain their competitive edge (Michael and
Combs 2008; Barthelémy 2008). These sessions also
serve to establish personal ties and even to socialize
franchisees by embedding them in the business culture
(Michael 2000). They may therefore enhance franchi-
sees’ affective commitment by promoting identification
with the chain’s goals and values. Moreover, if this
human capital is specific to the franchise chain, it also
raises switching costs in the same way that initial in-
vestments do. Similarly, most of the training costs cov-
ered by the franchisor are non-recoverable (being spe-
cific to each franchisee). As a result, training programs
will also increase the franchisor’s switching costs, thus
reducing his propensity to terminate the relationship.
Therefore, our hypothesis is:
2 Experienced franchisees may also be less compliant with the chain
standards because they are Bset in their ways^ (Lafontaine 1992) and
they may have more bargaining power (Michael 2000). Moreover,
experienced franchisees may have a better understanding (compared
to inexperienced ones) of the operation of the business and their local
markets, which increases their impulse to respond to the idiosyncratic
needs of their customers and, consequently, their temptation to forego
business standards (Kaufmann and Eroglu 1999). The net effect of
franchisees’ prior experience will reflect both positive and negative
influences of previous experience on conflict. We cannot test the
absence of any of these effects but only the prevalence of one over
the other.
3 The size of initial investments and/or the training provided to fran-
chisees are related to the nature of the industry and the particular
business model. However, even if they are not selected with the
purpose of reducing disruptions, we contend that they can shape
future behavior regarding terminations. As Williamson (1985) puts it,
there is a Bfundamental transformation^ once investments are made
and an ex ante competitive setting becomes an ex post bilateral mo-
nopoly where one party (franchisee) depends on the other (franchisor).
We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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& H2: Investments in physical and human capital (ini-
tial investments and training) reduce early termina-
tions by franchisors and franchisees.
2.1.3 Franchisor experience
Franchisor experience (in chain management) may re-
duce terminations by producing significant learning ef-
fects that can prevent conflict and franchisees’ failure.
First, experienced franchisors may reduce conflict by
promoting better selection of prospective franchisees. In
this regard, extant literature emphasizes that appropriate
selection processes have a positive effect on levels of
cooperation between franchisors and their franchisees
(Jambulingam and Nevin 1999; Clarkin and Swavely
2006). However, less experienced franchisors usually
lack the required knowledge and capabilities needed to
develop and perform effective recruitment and selection
processes (Weaven and Herington 2007; Weaven et al.
2010).
Second, since older franchisors are more likely to
have developed capabilities for monitoring their fran-
chisees,4 franchising experience will also help franchi-
sors to detect and avoid free-riding and subsequent
conflict within the system (Elango 2007; Baena and
Cervino 2012). Likewise, franchise experience helps to
develop capabilities to better transfer system knowledge
(Winter and Szulanski 2001; Holmberg and Morgan
2003; Frazer and Winzar 2005), which in turn will help
the franchisees to cope with their obligations within the
system and reduce tensions. In general, it may lead to
adequate due diligence (Weaven et al. 2010).
At the same time, chain size can also be expected to
expand as franchisors age, increasing the risk of litiga-
tion. Based on this life-cycle effect, some authors have
suggested a positive influence of franchisor experience
on the level of conflict and litigation within the chain
(Castrogiovanni et al. 1993; Michael 2000). However,
the extent to which the franchisor operates a larger
number of units may also positively influence his learn-
ing opportunities (e.g., the chance to develop monitor-
ing or selection capabilities) (Shane 1996; Elango 2007;
Argyres and Bercovitz 2015). Therefore, after control-
ling for the size of the chain, we expect a negative net
effect of franchisor experience on the probability of
contract terminations.
Hence, our hypothesis is as follows:
& H3: Franchisor experience will reduce early termi-
nations by franchisors and franchisees.
2.2 Franchisor control over pricing and advertising
policies
In this section, we analyze how franchisees’ autonomy
in pricing and local advertising policies may affect the
level of conflict and early terminations within the sys-
tem. Both of these policies have been suggested by the
literature to be peripheral aspects of business and suit-
able for delegating to franchisees (Michael 1996;
Bradach 1998; Windsperger 2004; Yin and Zajac
2004; Mumdziev and Windsperger 2011; Winter et al.
2012; Ater and Rigbi 2015). Moreover, Ater and Rigbi
(2015) showed that both policies might serve similar
purposes. That is, franchisors may use advertising to
encourage franchisees to offer particular prices even if
they are not obliged formally to follow the franchisor’s
suggestions.
However, we argue that franchisors and franchisees
may have different perceptions regarding the appropri-
ate level of empowerment in these decision areas. Con-
sequently, allocation of a specific decision right may
have opposite effects for either side of the partnership
regarding conflicts and their propensity to terminate the
franchise relationship.
2.2.1 Pricing
Franchisors and franchisees may disagree about the
prices that the franchisees charge their customers. Fran-
chisors receive income in the form of royalties paid by
franchisees. These royalties are usually calculated as a
percentage of outlet revenues, so franchisors have in-
centives to push franchisees to implement sales strate-
gies even if they result in lower levels of franchisee
profits (Phan et al. 1996). Franchisor goals are linked
to sales growth while franchisee goals are linked to both
sales and profits (Dant and Nasr 1998; Holmberg and
Morgan 2003). Therefore, depending on profit margins
and price elasticity, franchisors can gain higher royalties
with lower prices even if franchisees’ profits are not
increasing. Positive demand externalities and double-
4 Note that the skills needed to monitor franchisees may differ from
those needed to monitor employees in company-owned units (Shane
1996).
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marginalization problems in franchising illustrate this
conflict of interest (Blair and Lafontaine 2005).
Because of the use of a common tradename and
business format, demand is positively correlated across
all franchised units. In particular, the increase in demand
that follows a price reduction also benefits other outlets
in the system that will receive more clients. Neverthe-
less, since this positive externality is costly for franchi-
sees (i.e., effects on demand at other units do not in-
crease their individual profits), it will be underprovided.
Franchisors will then have fewer customers in their
company-owned outlets and, additionally, will collect
fewer royalties from franchisees.
Franchisors may also face double-marginalization
problems. Past research has found higher prices in fran-
chised than in company-owned outlets (Lafontaine
1999; Lafontaine and Scott Morton 2010; Ater and
Rigbi 2015) because they are able to set monopolistic
prices when granted exclusive territories. That is, fran-
chise chains are characterized by a Bsuccessive
monopoly^ market structure (i.e., there is market power
at both the production and distribution stages). There-
fore, franchisees may overprice relative to the level that
maximizes chain profits (Zanarone 2009), encouraging
franchisors to impose maximum resale price restraints.
Franchisors are interested in imposing not only price
ceilings but also minimum resale prices. Price reduc-
tions may also involve a drawback for franchisors.
Price-cutting promotions may compromise brand name
value because they tempt franchisees to cut their quality
to save costs while retaining their margins. Furthermore,
Kalnins (2003) found that price promotions may result
in intra-brand competition that does not increase the
chain’s market share, with new customers being
attracted from other outlets belonging to the same chain
instead of coming from rival brands.
It is worth noting that franchisors are not allowed to
impose prices on franchisees because of antitrust laws,
but they have informal means of influencing their deci-
sions and imposing price controls, such as labels with
suggested prices, rebates, and coupons.5
In summary, franchisors’ residual rents are very sen-
sitive to their franchisees’ pricing freedom (insufficient
sales growth, double marginalization problems, or inter-
nal price-wars with higher free-riding risks, etc.).
Therefore, the franchisees’ positive incentive effect as-
sociated with price decentralization is not expected to
compensate for the franchisor’s loss of control. In hy-
pothesis form:
& H4: Delegation of pricing is controversial; it will
lead to more early terminations by the franchisor
and fewer early terminations by franchisees.
2.2.2 Local advertising
Advertising of the franchise trademark is commonly
reported as a controversial issue between franchisor
and franchisees by both academics and practitioners
(see Michael 1999a and the references therein), because
their respective priorities differ in some regards.
Advertising benefits franchisors by providing them
with increased brand awareness and demand which, in
turn, will generate more royalties. However, franchi-
sees’ goals may diverge from those of the franchisor,
for at least three reasons (Michael 1999a). First, even
though franchisors usually collect royalties and adver-
tising fees separately to signal that the latter are actually
invested in advertising (and not used to other ends
unrelated to promotion of the brand) (Brickley 1999),
franchisees may not appreciate the yields of their invest-
ment and may distrust the franchisor’s use of the funds.
Second, franchisees demand different levels of expen-
diture depending on their tenure with the franchise
organization because newcomers find advertising more
rewarding (Dant and Berger 1996). Finally, franchisor
and franchisees may disagree over the appropriate level,
media, and geographic scope of the advertising, increas-
ing the franchisees’ interest in controlling advertising
policies.
Franchisors are also interested in monitoring adver-
tising because it is a way of adapting the system, since it
affects the uniform identity of every unit (Bradach
1998). For instance, by centralizing advertising franchi-
sors can encourage franchisees to follow certain system-
wide promotions that are critical for the chain’s image
(for example, when launching new key products) (Ater
and Rigbi 2015). These system-wide goals (e.g., to build
and improve a national image for the brand) are usually
accomplished through nationwide advertising cam-
paigns. In this sense, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween local advertising (promotional efforts with a
short-term impact undertaken in a limited trading area)
5 Note that antitrust regulations in Europe and USA are much less
severe for maximum resale prices than for minimum resale prices
(Blair and Lafontaine 2005).
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and national advertising (advertising efforts undertaken
in the national market with a long-term impact) (Bergen
and John 1997, Jørgensen et al. 2000).
In general, franchisors can protect uniformity by
centralizing national advertising. Moreover, economies
of scale for national image advertising usually justify
such centralization (Sigué and Chintagunta 2009). At
the same time, franchisors can take advantage of fran-
chisees’ local knowledge by delegating some local ad-
vertising, thus promoting the brand locally and increas-
ing sales at the franchisee store. In fact, franchisees
usually have extensive local market knowledge and
proximity to the customer (Clarkin 2008), which may
allow them to assess the specific messages and media
that will best meet their clients’ expectations.
Consequently, the positive incentive effect for fran-
chisees (resulting from the delegation of local advertis-
ing decisions) compensates for the franchisor’s potential
loss of control (that can be balanced by centralizing
national advertising). Therefore:
& H5: Delegation of local advertising will reduce ear-
ly terminations by franchisors and franchisees.
The hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.
3 Data collection and measurement
We tested our hypotheses in the Spanish franchise sec-
tor. The principal data sources were the two main pro-
fessional franchise guides edited in Spain (Barbadillo
2008; Tormo and Asociados 2008), which contain rele-
vant information on 847 franchise chains. This
information was combined with detailed primary data
obtained from a mail survey sent to the franchisor firms.
The questionnaires were sent to key informants who
could report on our main research topic (i.e., all respon-
dents held senior positions, such as franchising manager
or CEO).6 Completed questionnaires were received
from 163 franchise chains, giving a gross response rate
of 19.24%. However, the sample was deliberately re-
stricted to franchisors old enough to have had early
terminations, namely, with at least 4 years of continuous
operation. This also allowed us to eliminate contract
cancelations resulting exclusively from liabilities of
newness.7 This resulted in a total of 70 usable responses
with complete information.
We took several steps to minimize possible response
bias. First, our measures were developed in close con-
sultation with several experts in franchising. The ques-
tionnaire was also pretested with the managers of six
chains to verify the appropriateness of questionnaire
items (e.g., wording, instructions, measurement scales
…). Second, as per Podsakoff et al. (2003), the study
used various procedural remedies to avoid common
method bias in survey data. Specifically, the dependent
(contract terminations) and independent (e.g., franchisee
autonomy, training…) variables were placed in differ-
ent sections of the questionnaire; the questions were
formulated as concisely as possible; different scale for-
mats were used for certain key variables; and all partic-
ipants were assured anonymity and confidentiality. In
addition, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) approach
suggests that commonmethod bias is not likely to pose a
problem for this analysis.8
Table 1 Summary of hypotheses
Hypotheses Impact on
franchisee
terminations
Impact on
franchisor
terminations
H1 Prior industry experience
in franchisees
− −
H2 Franchisee investments
and training
− −
H3 Franchisor experience − −
H4 Franchisee autonomy on
pricing decisions
− +
H5 Franchisee autonomy on
local advertising
decisions
− −
6 The postal questionnaire was sent out during 2008. Both primary and
secondary information refers to 2008, and the 4 years that preceded the
survey, so the study avoids any distortions that the 2008–2015 Spanish
financial crisis might introduce in the number of early terminations.
7 Liabilities of newness are problems that emerging organizations have
to deal with because they have no experience in the incumbent market
(Tikoo 2002). Brickley et al. (2006) contain that franchise businesses
require 3 years to realize a normal return on their initial investments
and they also consider that a start-up franchisor is one that has 5 or
fewer years of experience. We took 4 years, the middle point value of
this interval (3–5), as the threshold to consider that franchisors have a
minimum amount of experience.
8 In the CFA approach, all the self-reported items are modeled as the
indicators of a single factor that represents method effects. Common
method bias is assumed to be important if the hypothesized model fits
the data. The results showed that the single-factor model did not fit the
data well, χ2 = 94.572 (21 df); p < 0.05; CFI = 0.779; NFI = 0.680;
NNFI = 0.668; RMSEA = 0.131. While these results do not preclude
the possibility of common method bias, they do suggest that it is not of
great concern in this study.
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Finally, comparison between respondents as per
Armstrong and Overton (1977) revealed no statisti-
cally significant differences on key constructs (e.g.,
number of terminations, franchisee autonomy, chain
size, sector) between early and late respondents.
Furthermore, we tested for a potential response bias
by comparing respondents and non-respondents on
two key features: system size and sub-sector of
activity. None of these test results showed signifi-
cant differences at the 0.05 level.
3.1 Measurement
3.1.1 Contract terminations
This study considers two dependent variables, the
number of contract terminations initiated by the
franchisor (ZOR_Terminations) and the number of
t e rmina t i ons in i t i a t ed by h i s f r anch i s ee s
(ZEE_Terminations). Both variables take positive
discrete values in the time period considered and
were built on franchisor responses for the following
items9: (i) Number of early terminations initiated by
the franchisor over the last 4 years. (ii) Number of
early terminations initiated by the franchisees over
the last 4 years.
3.1.2 Franchisees’ business experience
Among the independent variables, a dummy variable is
used to indicate whether the franchisor requires previous
b u s i n e s s e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e f r a n c h i s e e
(ZEE_Experience), as in Lafontaine (1992) andMichael
(2000). This variable was measured in the questionnaire
by the following item: (i) Do you require your prospects
to have previous experience in your industry to join the
chain?
3.1.3 Franchisees’ investments in physical and human
capital
To capture the level of specific investments made
by franchisees, we included two measures. (1) First,
we considered the level of the franchisee’s initial
i n v e s tm e n t r e q u i r e d t o o p e n a n o u t l e t
(INVESTMENT) as stated in the professional
guides. A franchisee’s initial investment includes
capital expenditure, most of which is non-
recoverable (Lafontaine 1992), on items such as
upfront fee, real estate, leasehold improvements,
equipment, outlet alteration and decoration, sign-
age, uniforms, licenses, grand opening advertising
and consulting, and professional fees.
(2) Second, we considered two types of franchise
training programs to proxy for the franchisees’ level
of specific human capital and commitment. Franchi-
sors may offer two types of training, initial training
for new franchisees, and annual ongoing training
programs for all franchisees (Windsperger 2004).
Therefore, two possible variables were initially con-
sidered. On the one hand, Initial_Training measures
the training time (in weeks) that new franchisees
must undergo to join the franchise system. On the
other hand, Ongoing_Training is a dummy variable
that takes value 1 when current franchisees must
undergo annual training programs to keep updated
in new policies and procedures regarding system
standards.
3.1.4 Franchisor experience
The franchising experience of the franchisor
(ZOR_Experience) was calculated as the number of
years since the franchise system was established. Since
maturity or age is usually subject to a diminishing effect
(Holmberg and Morgan 2003; Brickley et al. 2006;
Argyres and Bercovitz 2015), we took the logarithms
of the variable.
3.1.5 Franchisees’ autonomy regarding pricing
and (local) advertising policies
In order to measure this characteristic, the respon-
dents were requested to indicate the degree of em-
powerment of their franchisees (based on existing
authority and control over decision-making) on a
five-point Likert scale adapted from Windsperger
(2004) and Kidwell et al. (2007) (1 = no extent,
5 = to a very large extent) in (1) local advertising
and (2) pricing. This enabled the construction of the
DELEGPricing and DELEGAdvertising variables
(See Survey Appendix).
9 The questions and scales included in the questionnaire are attached in
an appendix.
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3.1.6 Control variables
Two control variables were added to the model to
address system size effects (ChainSIZE) and sector
effects (retail-type chain). First, ChainSIZE was
measured using the total number of outlets in the
system. This variable controls for the influence that
the number of franchisees may have on early termi-
nations, considering that larger chains are simply
more exposed to conflict (when measured as total
terminations).
In addition, an industry dummy variable was used to
control for the sector, RETAIL. This variable takes value
1 for retail-type chains and accounts for idiosyncrasies
in retailing vs. service sectors (Windsperger 2004;
Barthelémy 2008).
4 Analytical procedure and results
Our dependent variables, namely, the number of
early terminations initiated by both franchisors
( Z OR _ Te r m i n a t i o n s ) a n d f r a n c h i s e e s
(ZEE_Terminations), are limited dependent count
variables which take zero or positive values (See
Table 2 for a more detailed description). The clas-
sic OLS model is unsuitable for modeling count
data. But linear exponential models such as the
negative binomial (NB) and Poisson models pro-
vide a good alternative (See , for example,
Hausman et al. 1984; Cameron and Trivedi 1986,
2013).
The simplest form of count data model is the one
in which the dependent variable (yi = number of
early terminations) follows Poisson distribution.10
This model assumes that the variable of interest
(yi) occurs at a rate (μi) over a certain period of
time, so that the variance of yi is equal to the mean
μi. Therefore, the expected number of early termi-
nations in each period will verify that
E yijxið Þ ¼ Var yijxið Þ ¼ μi ¼ eβ
ËCXi : ð1Þ
The equation of interest here is the rate parameter μi,
which is the mean number of early terminations per
period given the independent variables, and is formulat-
ed as:
ln μi ¼ βËCX i
 
ð2Þ
where i indexes franchise chains, X is the matrix of
independent variables, and β is the vector of coefficients
to be estimated (Greene 1997). Since we have two
different dependent variables, ZEE_Terminations
(yi
ZEE) and ZOR_Terminations (yi
ZOR), Eq. (2) must
be estimated for both the mean number of franchisees’
early terminations: μi
ZEE (Eq. (A)) and the mean number
of franchisors’ early terminations: μi
ZOR (Eq. (B)).
Table 2 Frequencies of early terminations
Number of early
terminations
initiated by
franchisees
Frequency
(%)
Number of early
terminations
initiated by
franchisor
Frequency
(%)
0 47.1% 0 47.1%
1 8.6% 1 20.0%
2 11.4% 2 12.9%
3 7.1% 3 7.1%
4 5.7% 4 4.3%
5 5.7% 5 2.9%
6 2.9% 6 4.3%
7 1.4% 8 1.4%
10 1.4%
13 1.4%
14 2.9%
15 1.4%
18 1.4%
25 1.4%
Total observations: 70
Total terminations: 201
Mean: 2.87
Total observations: 70
Total terminations: 95
Mean: 1.36
Terminations are, on average, higher for franchisees than for
franchisors. 95 contracts were terminated early by franchisors
and 201 by franchisees over the period considered
10 Given the vector of explanatory variables, xi, the basic probability
f u n c t i o n o f t h e P o i s s o n d i s t r i b u t i o n i s
Prob Y i ¼ yijxið Þ ¼ μyii  e
−μi
yi !
for y ¼ 0; 1; 2….
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Conditional mean of franchisee terminations
lnμZEEi ¼ βËCX i
 
lnμZEEi ¼ β0 þ β1ZEE−Experience
þ β2Initial−Investmentþ β3Initial Training
þ β4Ongoing Trainingþ β5ZOR−Experience
þ β6DelegPricingþβ7DelegAdvertising
þ β8Retailingþ β9ChainSizeþ error
ðAÞ
Conditional mean of franchisor terminations
lnμZORi ¼ βËCX i
 
lnμZORi
¼ β0 þ β1ZEE−Experience
þ β2Initial−Investment
þ β3Initial Training
þ β4Ongoing Training
þ β5ZOR−Experience
þ β6DelegPricingþβ7DelegAdvertising
þ β8Retailingþ β9ChainSizeþ error ðBÞ
However, count data do not usually respect the mean-
variance equality restriction (1), resulting in an
overdispersion (or extra-Poisson variation) problem in
the rate μi (Cameron and Trivedi 1986). In our model,
overdispersion would take place if the probability of one
early termination within a franchise system is affected by
the presence of other early terminations (i.e., if there is a
lack of independence in the occurrence of early termina-
tions for each observation). A more generalized model to
account for the overdispersion problem is based on the
NB probability distribution (See Hausman et al. 1984).11
To take this possibility into account, we performed a
likelihood ratio test between the Poisson and the NB
regressions (Cameron and Trivedi 1990) for both
Eq. (A) and Eq. (B) (Table 3). The tests revealed that
overdispersion exists in our count data regarding both
franchisee12 and franchisor terminations,13 so we used a
NB model to estimate μi
ZEE (Eq. (A)) and μi
ZOR
(Eq. (B)). Michael (2000: 503) explained overdispersion
when considering franchise litigation because the proba-
bility of one lawsuit within the franchise system may be
affected by the presence of other lawsuits. Specifically,
one franchisee engaging in free-riding (quality shirking)
may encourage others to do the same. At the same time, a
franchisor’s decision to litigate and terminate the contrac-
tual relationship with a franchisee may lower litigation
costs with other franchisees. Similarly, one franchisee’s
decision to litigate and terminate the contract with the
franchisor may encourage other franchisees to do the
same (and share the costs of litigation).
4.1 Results
The results of the NB regressions of Eq. (A) (franchisee
terminations) and Eq. (B) (franchisor terminations) are
presented in Table 4.14 Means, standard deviations, and
correlations among variables are reported in Table 3.
The estimated equations are significant at the 1% level.
Regarding H1, contrary to our expectations, experi-
enced franchisees seem to increase contract terminations
initiated by franchisors (β1
ZOR
Model B = 0.304*). On the
other hand, franchisees’ previous experience
(ZEE_Experience) does not have any significant effect
on early terminations initiated by franchisees. Past litera-
ture shows that franchisors do not agree on this require-
ment, because experienced franchisees may be more dif-
ficult to socialize or less compliant with franchisor au-
thority (Lafontaine 1992; Stanworth and Kaufmann
1996; Frazer 2001). Specifically, our finding suggests that
recruiting experienced franchisees does not have advan-
tages for avoiding misconceptions and improving their
performance and satisfaction with the franchise system.
Moreover, franchisees who were familiar with the indus-
try seemed to be more troublesome for the franchisors.
With regard to franchisees’ specific investments and
commitment, H2 predicted that by raising their switching
costs or enhancing their affective commitment, franchise
upfront investment (Initial_Investment) and training pro-
grams (Initial_Training and ONGOING_Training) would
reduce early terminations. Our results only support this
hypothesis for franchisee terminations. First, initial invest-
ment reduces early terminations initiated by franchisees
11 In the case of the negative binomial model the variance is not equal
to the mean. Specifically, Var(yi| xi) = μi +φg(μi), where φ denotes the
dispersion parameter. Once the negative binomial model is estimated,
the presence of significant overdispersion is given by the significance
of the φ coefficient.
12 Likelihood ratio test for NB (versus Poisson) equals 28.6 (1 df),
significant at p < 0.001.
13 Likelihood ratio test for NB (versus Poisson) equals 9.658 (1 df),
significant at p < 0.005.
14 The condition index of all predictors is below 20, as recommended
by Green (1997), suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a major issue
in this research.
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(β2
ZEE
Model A = −0.012***), but this variable has no
significant effect on franchisors’ terminations as found
by Argyres and Bercovitz (2015). This result suggests
that it is contrary to the franchisees’ self-interest to end the
relationship when they have to make large initial invest-
ments. However, larger initial investments do not neces-
sarily mean that (1) the franchisors’ interests are better
met by the franchisees (i.e., such investments will not
necessarily increase franchisee’s interest in pursuing sys-
tem goals) or (2) the set-up costs regarding franchisee
replacement are higher.
Second, while negative, the coefficient for
Ongoing_Training is only statistically significant in the
franchisees’ model (β4
ZEEs
Model A = −1.126***). One
plausible explanation for this outcome is that ongoing
training programs actually increase the level of sociali-
zation and specific human capital developed by franchi-
sees, thus increasing their switching costs associated
with termination. However, from the franchisor’s point
of view, such annual programs could be considered just
a necessary (and costly) tool used to transfer specific or
tacit know-how to their franchisees (Windsperger 2004;
Barthelémy 2008). On the other hand, Initial_Training
does not have significant coefficients, so offers no sup-
port for these training programs as effective tools in the
prevention of early terminations.
Interestingly, accordingly to our H3, the franchisor’s
prior experience in franchising (ZOR_Experience) has a
significant negative coefficient for both franchisee ter-
minations (β5
ZEE
Model A = −1.830**) and franchisor
terminations (β5
ZOR
Model B = −0.870*). These results
are consistent with previous qualitative studies that re-
ported less rigorous recruitment and reduced due dili-
gence of less experienced franchisors (Frazer and
Winzar 2005; Weaven et al. 2010). Thus, learning ef-
fects in chain management seem particularly useful to
franchisors and franchisees in order to prevent serious
conflicts with their partners.
Results regarding variables measuring the degree of
franchisee autonomy (DELEGAdvertising and
DELEGPricing) confirm that franchisee and franchisor
preferences about decision rights allocation may differ
significantly.
Fi rs t ly, the coeff ic ients for the var iable
DELEGPricing confirm H4. That is, these coefficients
are significant and negative for terminations initiated by
franchisees (β6
ZEEs
ModelA = −0.322*), and significant and
posi t ive for those in i t i a ted by franchisors
(β6
ZOR
ModelB = 0.177**). This is a controversialT
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outcome: to allow franchisees to set their own prices
constitutes a significant source of conflict for franchisors.
But, at the same time, this decision-making arrangement
helps reduce franchisees’ discontent and terminations.
Finally, the DELEGAdvertising variable has the ex-
pected significant and negative coefficient for franchisor
terminations (β7
ZOR
ModelB = −0.181**). This result sug-
gests that franchisors may actually benefit from franchi-
sees’ specific knowledge in developing local advertising
campaigns. In contrast, the degree of delegation of local
advertising decisions does not have an impact on fran-
chisees’ early terminations. So H5 is partially supported.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Building upon agency and resource-based theories, this
work examines the antecedents of franchise termina-
tions. The analysis highlights the influence of franchi-
sees’ entrepreneurial autonomy on terminations and re-
veals the main differences between franchisee and fran-
chisor concerns in this setting.
A key finding is that there are no strong commonalities
between partners (franchisors and franchisees) as regards
their reactions to various antecedents of early termina-
tions. First, we hypothesized that franchise conditions that
lessen detrimental heterogeneity in terms of commitment
or business acumen between both parties should not be
controversial (i.e., they should prevent terminations initi-
ated by either franchisors or franchisees). These variables
are franchisee industry experience, training, initial invest-
ment, and franchisor experience in chain management.
However, franchisees’ previous industry experience
only has a significant and unexpected positive effect on
franchisor terminations. Therefore, far from reducing con-
flict by realistically and appropriately shaping franchi-
sees’ ex ante expectations and adding valuable know-
how to overcome future errors, franchisees’ industry
knowledge seems to increase franchisor terminations.
This outcome is consistent with Lafontaine (1992) who
predicted that industry experience may prevent effective
learning by franchisees, who will need to be re-educated.
Additionally, Michael (2000) showed that previous expe-
rience of franchisees may increase litigation by enhancing
franchisees’ bargaining power and hindering possible
agreements with franchisors. More generally, Gottschalk
et al. (2017) found no advantage of habitual entrepreneurs
over novice entrepreneurs in terms of survival, although
those with industry experience tend to survive longer. We
interpret that franchise ventures represent original tem-
plates and past industry experience does not help to
disentangle the causes of business success.
Other franchise requirements such as initial investment
and ongoing training programs tend to reduce franchisee
Table 4 Regressions of early terminations in franchise systems
Hypotheses Variables Terminations by FRANCHISEESa (model A) Terminations by FRANCHISORSb (model B)
– (Constant) 3.762 (1.2745) −0.476 (0.6363)
H1 ZEE_Experience (1/0) 0.294 (0.4270) 0.304 * (0.1709)
H2 Initial investment (€) −0.012 *** (0.0410) −5.103E−7 (8.6259E−7)
Initial_Training −0.068 (0.1107) 0.12 (0.0307)
Ongoing_Training (1/0) −1.126 *** (0.4030) 0.296 (0.3218)
H3 ZOR_Experience (log years) −1.830** (0.8444) −0.870 * (0.4521)
H4 DELEGPricing −0.322* (0.1643) 0.177 ** (0.0816)
H5 DELEGAdvertising 0.205 (0.1814) −0.181 ** (0.0904)
Control Retail-type chain (1/0) 0.149 (0.3772) 0.168 (0.1766)
Control ChainSIZE 0.007 *** (0.0025) 0.002 * (0.0009)
Chi-squared test (for all zero coefficients) 40.495*** 18.444**
D (residual deviance) 71.315 75.339
Negative binomial (NB) regression of early terminations by FRANCHISEES (model A) and negative binomial (NB) regression of early
terminations by FRANCHISORS (model B) (conditional mean of early terminations. Standard errors in parentheses)
Notes: Sample size is 70. Significance levels are noted: *** p < 1%; ** p < 5%; * p < 10%
a) Likelihood ratio test of this model NB vs. Poisson equals 28.6 (1 df). Significant at p < 0.001
b Likelihood ratio test of this model NB vs. Poisson equals 9.658 (1 df). Significant at p < 0.005
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terminations but do not affect those initiated by the fran-
chisor. We interpret that these requirements increase the
franchisees’ economic and affective commitment to the
chain, thus lowering the incidence of franchisees’ termi-
nations (Mignonac et al. 2015; Frazer and Winzar 2005;
Meek et al. 2011). On the one hand, initial investments
may bind the franchisees to the franchise relationship,
delaying their exit decisions (i.e., early terminations) by
raising the costs of dissolving the relationship (Kang and
Jindal 2015). However, we show that they cannot reduce
conflicts that end up in franchisor terminations. From this
point of view, high initial investments may lead to the
paradox of promoting unsatisfying but stable franchise
relationships. On the other hand, ongoing training can
make franchisees more socialized and better aligned with
the franchisor, increasing their desire to avoid conflicts
and stay in the relationship (Michael 2000). However, it
can also increase the bargaining power of franchisees (i.e.,
they become more valuable to the franchisor) and thus
intensify hold-up risks. In fact, our results suggest that this
negative outcome balances out the positive socialization
effect of training for franchisors, making it ineffective for
preventing franchisor terminations.
The influence of the last conflict inhibitor, that is,
franchise experience in chain management, suggests
that franchisors that have been franchising for a longer
period are able to recruit more suitable franchisees and/
or are able to develop a positive climate in the relation-
ship, generating committed franchisees. Taking both
findings regarding experience together, we observe dif-
ferent outcomes depending on who has gained the ex-
perience. Whereas franchisor experience reduces con-
flict, franchisee industry experience tends to increase the
probability of franchisor terminations.
Second, our findings highlight that the entrepreneur-
ial autonomy of franchisees has a significant and com-
plex influence on franchise terminations. Specifically,
its influence differs depending on the decision area
considered and the type of termination.
Specifically, the degree of franchisee autonomy in
local advertising policies produces a debatable outcome.
Franchisors terminate fewer contracts when they allow
franchisees to decide on local advertising. Therefore, we
interpret that franchisors can capitalize on franchisees’
knowledge of local markets for local advertising (Sigué
and Chintagunta 2009) without incurring significant
moral hazard. However, the delegation of such decision
rights does not have a significant impact on franchisees’
terminations. This is a puzzling result, since
practitioners and past research indicate that franchisees
pay great attention to advertising issues (Michael 1999a,
2014). We speculate that possible inconsistencies or
asynchrony in local marketing campaigns may cause
horizontal coordination problems and increase conflict
among neighboring franchisees. While this drawback of
decentralization does not directly affect franchisor’s in-
terests, it may overshadow the predicted franchisees’
benefits of holding local advertising responsibilities,
resulting in a null effect on their terminations.
Pricing is an evenmore controversial issue. Although
antitrust laws do not allow them to impose prices, fran-
chisors should note that they can reduce the number of
terminations they initiate by centralizing pricing deci-
sions. However, centralized pricing comes at the cost of
increased probability of franchisees terminating their
contracts. On the other hand, franchisors should be
cautious about the consequences of delegating pricing
authority for brand name value, because quality reduc-
tions tend to come after price cuts to make up for margin
reductions. They therefore need to choose between
monitoring franchisees more closely to prevent damag-
ing actions (and to be aware when discounts are applied)
and allowing higher franchisee exit rates.
Overall, our results help explain the sources of con-
flict and terminations in the franchise partnership. We
provide new evidence on how different franchise provi-
sions (such as investment obligations, training pro-
grams, and experience requirements) and different
decision-making structures affect premature termina-
tions. In addition, to our knowledge, this is the first
study that empirically examines the differences in the
drivers of terminations depending onwho terminates the
relationship. Thus, we expand the extant research by
filtering the noise introduced when all terminations are
studied together and provide new insights on the mis-
alignment between franchisors’ and franchisees’ inter-
ests. A main contribution in this regard is to identify, for
the first time, which factors can (i) increase (or prevent)
terminations initiated by both franchisors and franchi-
sees, (ii) influence only one type of termination (fran-
chisor vs. franchisees), and (iii) prevent terminations
initiated by one party while increasing those initiated
by the other party. This latter category poses a major
challenge regarding conflict management.
The present study also contributes to the entrepreneur-
ial literature in various ways. First, it responds to the calls
to examine the relationship between entrepreneurial au-
tonomy (as a relevant dimension of the firm
López-Fernández and López-Bayón
entrepreneurial orientation) and performance (Lumpkin
et al. 2009). We analyze this relationship in the franchise
setting by exploring the management dilemma of how to
provide autonomy to franchisee entrepreneurs to develop
their ventures whilst ensuring a homogeneous brand im-
age for the system. In this regard, this study also responds
to calls for the application of entrepreneurial dimensions
to contexts that have previously not been considered
(Wales et al. 2011; Audretsch et al. 2015). Namely, we
expand the analysis from the firm-level to the supra-level
of inter-firm partnerships (represented by franchising en-
trepreneurs). In doing so, instead of further exploring the
positive performance outcomes linked to entrepreneurial
autonomy (such as innovation and growth), our findings
provide new and valuable information on its drawbacks,
i.e., the role of autonomy for explaining partnership fail-
ure. Finally, we provide a more fine-grained analysis of
performance outcomes by showing that the entrepreneur-
ial autonomy of franchisees influences serious conflict
and terminations differently depending not only on the
type of decision area in which it is exercised (i.e., pricing
vs. advertising) but also on who decides to terminate the
relationship (i.e., the franchisor vs. the franchisee).
This study has important practical implications. First,
our results show the importance of avoiding conflicts
that lead to terminations in the franchise relationship. As
the empirical tests show, terminations are not isolated,
self-contained episodes. In fact, terminations present
overdispersion, which means that, once the franchisor
terminates a contract, he/she may find a sort of economy
of scale in the process that may lead the company to
terminate additional ones. Similarly, termination by one
franchisee may tempt others to also terminate their
contracts. These results are coherent with findings by
Winsor et al. (2012) regarding conflict resilience. As
these authors show, conflict has long-lasting negative
impacts on franchisees that impair cooperation between
partners. Further research may explore this problem in
other inter-firm networks.
Our findings also highlight the tension inherent in the
exercise of entrepreneurial autonomy within networks.
Franchisors should be aware that whereas some franchi-
see initiatives reduce terminations on one side of the
franchise team, they may have the opposite effect on the
other (i.e., franchisee autonomy in pricing).
We also underline the need to consider whether past
experience may help entrepreneurs to run their business
or whether it may be counterproductive increasing ten-
sions with franchisors that pursue a different business
idea. Our study complements the findings of Gottschalk
et al. (2017) in a low-tech context such as franchising
relationships.
5.1 Limitations and future research
An important limitation of this study is that our infor-
mation about terminations was provided exclusively by
franchisors. In fact, it is very difficult to locate franchi-
sees who have abandoned their systems (ex-franchisees)
(Frazer andWinzar 2005). We attempted to mitigate this
problem by using, whenever possible, specific and ob-
jective questions. However, future research may enrich
these findings by contacting ex-franchisees.
Secondly, this study is not exhaustive in its analysis of
conflict. Conflict is a dynamic process composed of a
series of conflict episodes (Antia et al. 2013; Winsor
et al. 2012) in which both parties may have a role. In this
study,we only observe the last step inmanifest and serious
conflicts, namely, contract terminations. Other conflicts,
not so salient as to end in terminations, may also under-
mine franchise performance. It may be fruitful to explore
factors that could have an impact on other conflicts, even
if they do not significantly influence early terminations.
An additional limitation comes from franchisee het-
erogeneity within franchise chains, which we do not test
and which may lead to customized relationships with
different franchisees. We expect that such differences
are mostly limited by selection processes that search for
similar franchisee profiles, although some heterogeneity
may remain. For instance, our conceptualization of the
decision-making structure in franchise systems does not
take into account possible internal distinctions among
the level of empowerment of current franchisees (e.g.,
single unit versus multi-unit franchisees). That is, par-
ticular franchisees with different skills (or bargaining
power) may require different contractual solutions that
take such differences into account. More fine-grained
data on franchisee characteristics and on particular
franchisor-franchisee dyads is required to address this
issue. In the same vein, we do not consider how internal
heterogeneity regarding franchisees’ local conditions
may influence the relationship between franchisees’
entrepreneurial autonomy and early termination.
Finally, further research may also filter prior experi-
ence of franchisees by considering management experi-
ence in other businesses and local knowledge of the
market. Our study is limited to industry experience.
Research into these aspects would add significant value.
Antecedents of early terminations in franchising
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